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Abstract. In this paper we explore the potential role of entrepreneurship in public sector 
organisations. At first, we present a review of the entrepreneurship theme in the political 
science and public management research streams, comparing these ideas with the mainstream 
business literature on entrepreneurship. Thereafter, we illustrate empirically how Stevenson’s 
classical framework of entrepreneurship can be applied in a European local government 
context to explain the recent initiatives to compete for and utilise European Union structural 
funds. The empirical basis of the study is comprised of ten in-depth case studies of local 
government organisations, five in the UK and five in Italy. Finally, we propose five distinct 
types of entrepreneurial agents in the public sector: professional politician, spin-off creator, 
business entrepreneur in politics, career-driven public officer and politically ambitious public 






Conventional wisdom often identifies entrepreneurs with private-sector businessmen. In 
this paper we challenge this view as too narrow, and we attempt to broaden the scope of 
entrepreneurship to include also public sector contexts (more specifically local governments).  
Local governments in Europe are characterised by a fast-changing environment. Up to 
twenty years ago, they relied mainly on governmental funding and local taxes. However, the 
situation has changed (and is changing) everywhere in Europe. Central government funding 
has been reduced as a consequence of a new quasi-market approach. The existing service/tax 
situation is challenged by advocates of policy reforms to reduce local taxes and at the same 
time improve the efficiency of local government services (Ferlie et al., 1996; Massey, 1997; 
Bellone and Goerl, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The organisational behaviour and 
entrepreneurship literatures suggest that environmental turbulence lead to change and 
subsequently entrepreneurial behaviour (Schumpeter, 1949; Morris & Jones, 1999). Applying 
this broader thesis to the particular context of the local governments, we could argue that 
since national funds are reduced, services are becoming more costly and taxes cannot be 
significantly raised, entrepreneurial behaviour is likely to be observed in this public setting 
(this argument has been also posed but not really tested by Perlmutter and Cnaan, 1995: 35).  
The purpose of this study is to test the applicability of entrepreneurship in the public sector 
by analysing a common recent ‘venture’ within European local governments: the competitive 
bidding for European structural funds. Local government represents a new and fertile setting 
to explore public entrepreneurship (the few existing studies focus mainly on universities as the 
most ‘convenient’ type of organisation for academic scholars). The study has two research 
objectives: 
 3 
1. To model the European funding process in local government, testing specifically the 
applicability of entrepreneurship as an explanatory theoretical framework.  
2. To develop a typology of entrepreneurial agents in the public sector. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: First we review the theoretical background on public 
entrepreneurship. Subsequently, we present an overview of the local government context. 
Then, we discuss the methodological choices undertaken. Afterwards, we discuss the findings 
on the European funding process, in light of a theoretical framework of entrepreneurship. We 
then present and discuss a typology of entrepreneurs in the public sector and conclude with the 
implications of this study and further research directions. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
Mainstream definitions of entrepreneurship associated the phenomenon with new private 
firms making profit. Gartner (1985) have narrowly defined entrepreneurship as ‘the creation 
of new organisations’. Birley (2001) argued that entrepreneurship is about ‘wealth creation’ 
and ‘ownership’ and therefore, apart from new organisations, it includes other routes to 
ownership like franchising, corporate venturing, management buy-outs and business 
inheritance. Other scholars adopted ‘opportunity-based’ conceptualisations and suggested that 
entrepreneurship is about ‘discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities’ (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000), ‘without current control of the required resources’ (Stevenson, 1997).  
The concept of entrepreneurship in the public sector has only recently appeared in the 
mainstream entrepreneurship literature, defined as ‘the process of creating value for citizens 
by bringing together unique combinations of public and/or private resources to exploit social 
opportunities’ (Morris & Jones, 1999). The next section reviews three main streams of 
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studies, which touched upon public sector entrepreneurship: political science, public 
administration and business studies.  Insights from these fields are valuable as they shed light 
on the same phenomenon from different angles.  
During the 1980s, the political science literature coined the terms ‘political’ and ‘policy’ 
entrepreneur, which were used interchangeably. Kingdon (1984) introduced the concept of 
policy entrepreneur to analyse the policy agenda formation within US federal government. He 
described entrepreneurs as ‘advocates who are willing to invest their resources - time, energy, 
reputation, money - to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of 
material, purposive, or solidary benefits’ (Kingdon, 1984: 179).  
Schneider and Teske (1992) focused on the local conditions that affect the probability of 
a policy entrepreneur being found in a certain community and they identified policy success 
and status as driving motivation. They found that entrepreneurs were attracted by slack public-
sector resources and by the possibility of reallocating local budget to achieve their policy 
goals. In general, most of the research on political entrepreneurs applied the concept to 
biographical case studies focusing on the life of entrepreneurial leaders, or to the development 
and implementation of new policies (Kirchheimer, 1989; Roberts, 1992; Marsh, 1994; Borins, 
1998). 
 
In the public administration literature the focus of the research shifted from politicians, to 
public sector managers who acted as entrepreneurs. Scholars focused their attention on 
entrepreneurship models as means of achieving more efficient and successful organisations in 
non-profit and public settings (Moon, 1999). Ramamurti (1986) defined public entrepreneurs 
as ‘individuals who undertake purposeful activity to initiate, maintain, or aggrandise one or 
more public sector organisations’ and provided a practical description of what public 
entrepreneurs do.  Some interesting books appeared on the subject, based more on practical 
 5 
experience and observation rather than formal academic research. One of the most popular 
ones (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) narrated interesting experiences drawn from the American 
public sector. The authors described how the tax-revolt (tax payers dissatisfied with 
government performance refused to pay taxes) and the cut of federal funds implemented by 
Reagan’s government in the early 1980s have changed the way the public sector operates by 
developing alternative ways to deliver services. Osborn and Gaebler labelled this phenomenon 
“Entrepreneurial government”. In a similar vein, Leadbeater (1997) reported on a series of 
British experiences focusing primarily on the person: the ‘social entrepreneur’. The author 
referred to individuals who create innovative ways of tackling pressing and intractable social 
problems such as youth crime and drugs dependency. They take neglected and under-utilised 
resources - people and buildings - and find new ways to use them, which satisfy unmet and 
unrecognised needs. They often operate in non-profit and voluntary sectors.  
The emergence of the entrepreneurship phenomenon in the public sector raised an 
interesting debate in the public administration literature over the democratic responsibility of 
public managers and politicians. Terry (1993) argued that the differences between the private 
and the public sectors do not allow the adoption of the entrepreneurship model for public 
organisations. Entrepreneurship includes anti-democratic characteristics such as heavy 
reliance on domination and coercion, a preference for revolutionary change, and disrespect for 
tradition. In contrast, Bellone and Goerl (1992) argued that the compatibility between the 
actions of the public entrepreneur and the democratic values of the organisation could be 
safeguarded if he/she acted as ‘civic-regarding’ entrepreneur by pursuing the principles of 
democratic theory and acting on the interest of the citizens. Borins (2000) supported 
empirically the ‘proponents’ view of public entrepreneurship proving that their impact on their 
respective organisations was actually positive rather than negative. 
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In the management literature on entrepreneurship, Johannisson and Nilsson (1989) and 
Johannisson (1990) defined community entrepreneurs as local facilitators of entrepreneurial 
events. Community entrepreneurs operated at the local-community level to create a context for 
autonomous entrepreneurs, inspire them to start their businesses and assist them through their 
extended networks. Laukkanen & Niittykangas (2003) extended this concept to local 
developers with a more hands-on approach to initiate and foster new firms, operating at the 
micro (rather than the community) level, naming them ‘virtual entrepreneurs’. In our mind 
both community and virtual entrepreneurs have a regional-development objective and co-
ordinate activity in the broader local community, as opposed to the related but in a way 
narrower notion of political and public entrepreneurs who have a (public) organisational 
performance objective, in a similar fashion that corporate entrepreneurs operate for and within 
a corporation (e.g. Kemelgor, 2002).   
Boyett (1997) made an initial attempt to explore empirically the entrepreneurship process 
in the public sector. She defined as ‘public entrepreneurs’ individuals with the ability to spot 
market opportunities, to act on them through manipulation and driven by a desire for high 
level of social self-satisfaction. Uncertain environment, devolution of power, and re-allocation 
of resource ownership to unit management level are the precondition for the public 
entrepreneur to rise (Boyett, 1997). 
On a similar stance, Morris and Jones (1999) posited the applicability of the 
entrepreneurial concepts to the public sector. They stressed the similarities between public 
sector entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship in large corporations as both types of 
organisations have formalised hierarchies, established stakeholder groups with competing 
demands, deeply entrenched cultures and procedures to guide operations, a desire for power 
and security, and quite rigid systems governing financial controls, budgeting, and employee 
rewards. Also, managers in both types of organisations have higher job security, lower 
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personal responsibilities, and access to an established pool of resources (a similar comparison 
was presented by Sadler, 2000 in the public administration literature). Morris & Jones 
proceeded to develop a modified version of Stevenson’s (1989) framework applicable to 
public organisations. However, the conceptual development of the model is not backed or 
followed by any empirical evidence, or test of its applicability in the public sector context and 
therefore remains a mere theorising exercise (the authors argued but did not prove that the 
model can be applied in a public university).  
 
Table 1 summarises some key points drawn from the three groups of literature that have 
touched upon entrepreneurship in the public sector. It also compares the concepts of 
‘political’, ‘public’ and ‘community/virtual’ entrepreneurs with the mainstream literature 
concepts of the business entrepreneurs.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
The literature review demonstrated that entrepreneurship in public organisations is a 
phenomenon that has been investigated very little to date, especially in the entrepreneurship 
literature. The existing studies are mainly conceptual (based on intuition or informed opinion) 
and non-cumulative. The main methods used to provide evidence are ad-hoc biographies or 
case-studies. With the exception of Boyett (1997) there are no studies, which attempt to 
systematically identify and empirically model the actions of public entrepreneurs in well-
defined contexts. Additionally, the majority of the political science studies have focused on 
the American public sector, therefore remaining US biased.  
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This paper attempts to fill the above literature gap by empirically testing the applicability of 
the concept of public sector entrepreneurship in the context of European local government. 
The contextual basis of the study is elaborated in the following section.  
 
3. The European funding context 
 
From previous professional involvement with local governments, the authors observed that 
competitive bidding for European funds, initiated and driven by key individuals within the 
councils, represented a solution to their major funding problem. Success in initiating and 
driving the European funding process involved proactiveness, innovation, risk-taking, 
leadership and creativity, a combination of attributes associated with entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Miller & Friesen, 1982; Timmons and Spinelli, 2003).  
At this point we faced an interesting dilemma. What could be entrepreneurial regarding the 
European funding process? Would it be the creation of new infrastructure and/or services for 
the local residents (in which case the European funding represents the financial resource), or 
would it be the fund-raising itself (a ‘view’ of the phenomenon which focuses more on the 
planning and preparation of bids to acquire European funds, which are subsequently utilised 
for the planned project)? 
The authors decided to view the phenomenon from a funding ‘angle’ for reasons, which 
are explained below. A classical study by Schumpeter (1934: 74) identified innovation in fast-
changing environments as the essence of entrepreneurial behaviour. Schumpeter wrote: 
 
“We call entrepreneurs not only those ‘independent’ businessmen in an exchange economy who are usually 
so designated, but all who actually perform the function by which we define the concept, even if they are 
‘dependent’ employees of the company, like managers, members of boards of directors and so forth... It is 
the carrying out new combinations that constitutes the entrepreneur.... On the other hand our concept is 
narrower than the traditional one in that it does not include all heads of firms or managers or industrialists 
who may operate an established business, but only those who actually perform that function (p.74). 
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Other writers have accepted his identification of entrepreneurship with innovation, 
changing the previous classical-economics tradition of the term entrepreneur meaning 
basically a businessman (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). Recently, Shane and Venkataraman 
(2000) underlined the element of innovation as the difference between entrepreneurial 
opportunities and (just) profit opportunities - in other words they implied that entrepreneurial 
opportunities involve innovative actions and do not just create wealth. In the local government 
context, the projects developed for European funding applications were not always innovative 
per se. Often they represented typical local government projects (such as a school or a bridge). 
The identification and tapping of an alternative and competitive source of funding, breaking 
out of the traditional order (the dependency on national funds), represented Schumpteter’s 
“new combination”, and a more ‘innovative’ action.  
The current literature in public administration supports this view and labels as 
‘innovative’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ a new range of actions developed within public 
organisations and directed towards generating external earnings. Palfreyman (1989: 208), in 
his case study of entrepreneurship within the University of Warwick, mentioned how, the 
policy change introduced during the Thatcher government since 1979 and the cut in national 
funds, placed emphasis on the generation of external income by the universities. He described 
the “entrepreneurial path” of the University of Warwick in generating external earnings and in 
developing links with industry/commerce/the community. Similarly, Slaughter and Leslie 
(1997: 9) analysed the “entrepreneurial activities” developed within the university 
environment and focused on “institutional and professorial market or marketlike efforts to 
secure external monies”. Bellone & Goerl (1992) viewed public entrepreneurship as ‘an active 
approach to administrative responsibility that included generating new sources of revenue as 
well as providing new services’. 
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For reasons explained above, we selected the new phenomenon of competitive biding for 
European funding in local government as a potentially fertile context to test the applicability 
of entrepreneurship in public settings. We pose the following study-proposition:  
Entrepreneurial behaviour can be observed in the European funding process.  
 
4. Research methodology 
 
A qualitative approach, involving multiple case studies was employed. The phenomenon 
of European funding in local government was new and case-study design suits well new areas 
of enquiry (Eisenhardt, 1989). Also, multiple-case designs following a ‘replication logic’ have 
the advantage of being more compelling and robust than single-case studies (Yin, 1994).  
Our methodology had two phases: 
a) The first phase included ‘inductive’ modelling of the European funding process (an 
under-researched phenomenon). A useful guide for this inductive part of the study was 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) clear and tested method for inductive theory-building from multiple cases. 
A slight variation from Eisenhardt’s method was the type of theoretical outcome: we aimed to 
build a ‘process’ model of the European funding rather than a variance-theory. Process 
theories provide explanations in terms of events leading to an outcome (Langley, 1999) as 
opposed to variance theories, which explain relationships between dependent and independent 
variables. Eisenhardt argued that an essential feature of building theory for new phenomena 
(such as the European funding process) is the subsequent corroboration of the emerging model 
with some broader theoretical backbone. That lead to the second step of our methodology. 
b) In the second phase, we employed a ‘deductive’ logic (proposed by Yin, 1994) guided 
by our study-proposition. We aimed to test the fit between a pre-selected theoretical 
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framework (entrepreneurship) and the newly developed model of the European-funding 
process (a new ‘public-sector’ context).  
Therefore, our method represents a combination of phenomenon-specific theory-building 
(described by Eisehardt, 1989; Langley, 1999) and subsequently deductive ‘template testing’ 
in a new context (e.g. Pinfield, 1986). Once the existence of entrepreneurial behaviour in the 
European funding process was proven, we could then proceed to explore potential ‘types’ of 
public entrepreneurs.  
 
Data Sources. In-depth case studies were conducted among ten European local 
government units: five in the English region of Yorkshire and Humber and five in the Italian 
region of Piedmont. The profile of the Councils and the European Union (EU) funds they 
acquired are presented in table 2. The exact names of the local authorities are not disclosed, as 
some wished to remain anonymous and were promised confidentiality.  
The two countries chosen had institutional differences in the political and administrative 
systems, which added practical difficulty in data collection, but could strengthen the 
generalisability of the emerging theory. The following institutional differences are worth 
noting: 
a) The Italian local governments or ‘communes’ (unit of analysis) were well-known for 
their chronic fragmentation. The selected region of Piedmont on its own had 1,209 communes 
of which 634 had a population with less than a thousand (Spalla, 1995). This made the local 
administration fragile, with little resources available (in terms of financial and human capital). 
Instead, in England local councils on average are bigger in size and have more resources 
(Gray & Jenkins, 1998).    
b) Italy is an example of ‘clientelistic/patronage system’ where local political leaders, who 
are directly elected, deliver favours to their voters in exchange for electoral support. Political 
 12 
parties are important in the local elections and political networks are developed throughout the 
region to secure electoral and policy support. England represents an ‘economic-development 
system’ where local governments are engaged in promoting the economic development of 
their communities which they deliver in partnership with local institutions - voluntary and 
business organisations, citizens associations, etc. (Goldsmith, 1993; Gray and Jenkins, 1998; 
Savage and Atkinson, 2001). Political parties do not play an important role in the local 
councils elections, and most importantly, council leaders are not elected but are nominated by 
councillors.  
 
Subsequently, one region was selected for each country. To fit the research domain the 
selected regions had to be eligible for European funding. Both Yorkshire and Humber and 
Piedmont  were ex-industrial areas with high unemployment and low economic growth. Those 
characteristics made them eligible for Objective 2 European Union Structural Funds 
programme.  
Insert table 2 about here 
 
The study was conducted with a theoretical (and not statistical) sample (Gersick, 1988). 
The individual cases chosen within the two regions varied as much as possible in 
organisational setting and projects submitted. We started by identifying the success local 
government units had in their applications for European funding. Successful government units 
had a healthy and steady flow of funds whereas unsuccessful ones had either no European 
funds at all or negligible funding income for their sizei. Within each of the two regions we 
chose one successful and one unsuccessful case (a similar sampling plan was designed by 
Pettigrew (1988) to build theories on success versus failure of large British corporations). 
After the first round of interviews, it became apparent that the two successful cases had 
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similarities in the European funding process whereas the two unsuccessful ones did not have a 
process in place. Since the objective of the study was to build theory on the European funding 
process (subsequently exploring its fit with the broader entrepreneurship theory) we needed 
more successful cases in order to compare their process and build a model.  
Three additional successful councils were studied within each region, following the 
replication logic (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Gersick, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). The additional 
cases were chosen from different geographical areas within the regions, and where possible, 
different types of councils were represented (unitary authority and metropolitan borough in 
England, and communes of various sizes in Italy, which included provincial and regional 
capitals). We stopped at a total of eight successful cases after observing that all the results 
were highly consistent.  
 
Data Collection. To deal with the problems of construct validity and reliability, this study 
has applied the triangulation principle proposed by Yin (1994). Multiple sources of evidence 
were used including: 
Archival records. We started by contacting the regional bodies responsible for 
administering structural funds within each state. This first contact provided data relative to the 
amount of funds available within each region and in particular the funds absorbed by each 
local authority within that region. 
Focused interviews were conducted among members of support organisations with a 
central role in European funding such as regional offices and funding consultants. 
Structured interviews were conducted among the senior managers of the local authorities 
selected for the study. Each interview, which normally lasted for about two hours, was divided 
into sections exploring the following issues: 1) The process of applying for European funds 2) 
The interviewee’s experience in the job and the structure of the department 3) 
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‘Europeanisation’ (alignment with EU regulations) of the council under analysis 4) The 
professional and personal contacts of the interviewee and their role in the European funding 
process 5) The presence of an entrepreneurial agent within the council. Most of the questions 
were of an open-ended nature.  
A document analysis. We analysed the web-sites of the local authorities under 
consideration, together with their relevant documents such as European funding guidelines, 
local networks mapping, European strategy documents, local action plans, departmental 
structure and job descriptions, and summaries of European funded projects.  
 
A research database was created, which included notes and transcribed text from tapes 
recorded during the interviews, documents handled by the interviewees (such as figures of 
European funded projects, structure of the departments, local networks structure) and 
information collected by the researchers before the interviews, using the councils’ web-sites.  
The presence of a case study database increased the reliability of the entire research (Yin, 
1994).  
 
Data Analysis. A descriptive analysis of each case taken as a separate unit was carried out 
at the end of data collection for that case. The overall idea was to gain familiarity with the 
cases as stand-alone entities and put order among the amount of data collected (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Within-case analysis allowed us to improve the research tools, adding new questions 
and adjusting the ones formulated initially. A comparison of successful and unsuccessful 
cases was then conducted. A similar procedure was adopted for the analysis of the remaining 
six successful cases, where pairs of cases were selected and then similarities and differences 
were listed between each pair.  
 15 
The main analytical technique used for the inductive part of the study (modelling of the 
European funding process) was ‘visual mapping’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Langley, 1999). 
Process data (events, activities and decisions) were chronologically coded and mapped into 
graphical drawings for each case. Visual graphical representations are particularly attractive 
for the analysis of process data as they can be used to observe precedence, parallel processes 
and the passage of time (Langley, 1999). The process model was derived by a comparison of 
the visual maps of different cases and identification of common sequences of events. 
For the deductive part of the study the data was analysed using a ‘pattern-matching’ 
method (Yin, 1994). Starting from the general proposition that “entrepreneurial behaviour can 
be observed in the European funding process” we specified an expected ‘entrepreneurial’ 
pattern of behaviour, based on Stevenson’s (1989 & 1997) 6-dimention framework. To test 
our proposition we compared the actual pattern of behaviour from each successful case with 
the expected Stevenson’s ‘entrepreneurial’ pattern of behaviour. The ‘criteria’ for assessing 
the match between actual behaviour and entrepreneurial behaviour were described by 
Stevenson along each of the 6 dimensions.  
To explore the presence of different types of public entrepreneurs, we first identified the 
entrepreneurial agents within each local government and then looked for possible 
classification criteria. Woo et al (1991) pointed out that the criteria used to classify 
entrepreneurs tend to group around three main areas: Background, goals and management 
methods. We described each agent in terms of the above criteria, positioned these descriptions 
on a table and then looked for patterns, which could ‘cluster’ cases (minimise variability 
within cluster and maximize variability across clusters).   




5. Results and discussion 
 
5.1 Modelling the process of European funding 
 
The most common pattern found in the process literature is the linear sequence of 
“phases” that occur over time to produce a given result (e.g. Burgelman, 1983). The model of 
the European funding process (presented in figure 1) is comprised of 6 phases: Identification 
of the EU as a possible solution to the funding problem, Decision to develop projects and 
pursue the European funding route, Assessment of what is needed to acquire the funds, 
Development of new organisational initiatives in order to get the needed resources, 
Management of the process and Extraction of rewards for the driving individuals. 
  
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
1) Identification of the EU as a possible solution to the funding problem. The local 
government units under analysis identified the competitive European structural funds as a 
good new funding opportunity that could assist economic regeneration. One British MEP has 
argued: 
The Government started to cut the national funds for local authorities. The worst came in the mid-
1980s when the Government decided to close down most of the national coal mines and steel mills, 
creating a huge number of unemployed people within the Yorkshire and Humber area. Then it became 
almost impossible for the council to provide support for the community, especially for the large 
number of unemployed people. To find money became the main problem for the Council, which was 
trying to promote the economic and social regeneration of the area (Interview with an MEP for 
Yorkshire and Humber Region). 
 
All the cases analysed faced similar problems with their traditional local industries (fishing, 
textiles, automotive) and they all stressed the need for extra funds in order to redevelop their 
poor areas. The political science literature on Europeanisation also supports the view that the 
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European funding was an opportunity for local government to get out of their financial 
problems, compensating for the erosion of domestic regional policy assistance (Martin and 
Pearce, 1993).  
 
2) Decision to develop projects and pursue the European funding route. After identifying 
the European funding opportunity, a key individual within the local government decided to 
commit to its pursue (we call this person the ‘agent’). Envisioning the ‘concept’ of an 
organised and continuous process for generating project proposals developed with the specific 
goal of attracting European funds, and the subsequent decision to realise that vision was 
argued as a key step of the process by all the interviewees. 
 
3) Assessment of what is needed to write successful bids. After deciding to proceed with 
the initiative, the agents within the local governments under consideration, assessed the 
resources required for developing, bidding for, and implementing the projects. These 
resources consisted of projects ideas (new competitive ideas), bidding skills (fitting the project 
idea within the EU guidelines), political support (at the regional, national and EU level), 
partnership (including businesses, voluntary organisations, trade unions, governmental 
organisations, higher education institutions and organisations with social interests), and 
matching funds (the EU programmes provide funds towards 50-75% of the total cost of the 
project).  
 
4) Development of new organisational initiatives in order to get the needed resources. 
After the identification of the needed resources, the agents proceeded to action, i.e. the 
creation of initiatives in order to acquire the resources. The analysis of the interviews 
conducted has identified a range of such initiatives including: recruitment of skilled 
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professionals and training existing staff, employing external consultants, starting a European 
funding office, creating partnerships, and identifying financial sources for the matching funds.  
 
5) From planning to action: Management of the process. The interviews showed that 
after putting in place the new organisational initiatives and acquiring the necessary resources, 
the European funding agents had to focus on the action, making sure that the process kept 
running in a continuous fashion. Managerial skills were essential in this phase to secure a 
stream of European funding rather than some ad-hoc successes. We identified three types of 
actions for this phase: submitting bids (managing the application procedure and making sure 
that bids were developed according to the EU principles and requirements), implementing the 
projects (failure to implement the projects according to the EU time-scale could result in 
loosing the funds), and creating a European strategy (a corporate strategy which established 
aimed to maximise the benefits from the European funding). 
 
6) Extraction of the rewards for the driving individuals. The interviews revealed at least 
one individual within each organisation, who drove the European funding process with an 
enthusiasm and determination, which went far beyond his/her job responsibilities. A variety of 
rewards were mentioned by the agents themselves. The English agents were driven primarily 
by professional visibility and career progression, aspiring to a higher level of responsibility 
within the organisation or to a bigger, more prestigious council. In one case (case A) the 
person began a political career as a consequence of her success in the EU funding process. On 
the other hand, the Italian agents seemed to be after social recognition and an enhanced 
political careerii.  
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The inductive part of our study has allowed us to develop a process model of European 
funding. Two main differences were identified between the English and the Italian local 
governments:  
1) The English cases had a more linear approach to the European funding process. The 
required resources were first identified during a ‘resource-assessment’ phase and then 
controlled during an ‘initiative-development’ phase. Also, one of the main resources was 
already in place: They were experienced in working in partnerships, a strategy which was 
imposed by the central government as an effective way of promoting regional and local 
economic development (which makes England an economic-development system). In Italy, 
the agents learned incrementally (step-by-step) which resources were needed, and how to 
acquire and manage them and therefore there were iterative loops between the resource-
assessment and the initiative-development phases of the model. The fact that the Italian 
councils were smaller than their English counterpart and had less financial and human 
resources to invest into the ‘venture’ might partly explain their ‘trial and error’ iterative 
process. 
2) Also, the driving agents in the two regions had different career paths - public officers in 
England as opposed to politicians in Italy - and therefore had a different set of rewards. This 
could be explained by the fact that council leaders in England were not directly elected and 
had very little power while in Italy the mayors were high-profile politicians.  
 
In conclusion, despite individual differences between cases, the data showed (at a more 
general level of analysis) the existence of a common underlying process that could be equally 
applied to all the councils involved.  
 
5.2 Applicability of Stevenson’s dimensions to the European funding process  
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In this section we deductively test the proposition that “entrepreneurial behaviour can be 
observed in the European funding process” by comparing the actual pattern of behaviour from 
the case studies with an expected ‘entrepreneurial’ pattern of behaviour, based on Stevenson’s 
(1989 & 1997) entrepreneurship framework.   
Stevenson defined entrepreneurship as ‘the pursuit of opportunity without current control 
of the required resources’. He then proposed a framework of six dimensions (strategic 
orientation, commitment to opportunity, commitment of resources, control of resources, 
management structure, and reward philosophy) to differentiate entrepreneurial from 
administrative organisations. Entrepreneurial organisations were lead by ‘promoters’ who felt 
confident in their ability to seize an opportunity regardless of the resources under control. On 
the other hand administratively managed organisations were lead by ‘trustees’ who 
emphasised the efficient utilisation of existing resources (Stevenson, 1997). Stevenson 
conceptualised each dimension, as a continuum with promoters at one extreme and trustees at 
the opposite extreme and offered descriptions of entrepreneurial and administrative behaviour 
along each dimension.  These descriptions were used as ‘criteria’ to match the actual (case-
studies) to the expected (entrepreneurial) pattern of behaviour (as proposed by Yin, 1994), as 
follows:  
 
Strategic orientation describes the factors that drive a company’s formulation of strategy. 
An entrepreneurial orientation places the emphasis on opportunity (rather than on the 
resources currently controlled), which can be related to a new product, a new mix of old ideas 
or the creative application of traditional approaches. The 8 successful councils had an 
opportunity-orientation as they ‘recognised’ the potential of the European funding (first step 
of the process) without controlling the needed resources. This opportunity driven behaviour 
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was triggered by changes in political rules (cut of national funds) and in local economic 
situation (closing down of local industries). 
 
Commitment to opportunity is moving beyond the identification of an opportunity. For 
the promoter this refers to the willingness of acting in a very short-time frame. For the trustee 
it means to move slowly and commit within a long-time frame. In the second phase of the 
funding process, ‘entrepreneurial’ agents acted fast to seize the opportunity. The window of 
opportunity was short and timing was extremely important, both in lobbying to get the area 
eligible for European funds but also in meeting the strict application-deadlines. 
 
Commitment of resources needed to pursue a given opportunity: The promoter’s 
behaviour is characterised by minimising the resources committed and by adopting a multi-
staged commitment of those resources. The trustee instead analyses carefully the resources 
needed and then proceed to a large-scale commitment. In the European funding process, 
Italian agents adopted a ‘trial and error’ approach to assessing and committing resources, 
which clearly reflected the multistage approach of Stevenson’s promoter. The English cases 
had a more organised and holistic approach to assessing resources, but when it came to 
commitment they also implemented a cautious multi-stage approach. 
 
Control of resources refers to the ability of the promoters to use other people’s resources 
and decide over time what resources they need to acquire. The trustee’s attitude instead is to 
own the required resources. In the European funding process the agents mentioned how 
difficult it was for the council to employ new personnel and how they had to identify  
‘talented’ people from other departments to initiate the funding venture. These ‘borrowed’ 
professionals had to accomplish their daily job and, on the top of it, to deal with the new 
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funding initiative. This minimal exposure or bootstrapping behaviour was close to the 
promoter end of Stevenson’s spectrum. 
 
Management structure describes the management ability of the entrepreneurs to co-
ordinate non-controlled resources. Entrepreneurial management is characterised by flat 
hierarchies with multiple informal networks while administrative management is based on 
hierarchy and authority. The European funding process, from the bidding to the 
implementation of projects, was managed through an informal network-structure with the 
agent at the central point. As mentioned above, often the people involved in the process where 
not employed directly by the agents (and therefore did not report formally to them) but they 
were part of their personal and professional network, being driven by the charisma of the 
leader and by the communicated enthusiasm for the project. Therefore, the management 
structure in the European funding process was close to the entrepreneurial end of the 
spectrum. 
 
Reward philosophy refers to the creation and harvest of value. According to Stevenson, 
financial gain is the main factor differentiating behaviour between the two extremes of the 
spectrum. ‘Entrepreneurial’ organisations are more explicitly focused in the creation and 
harvest of value (i.e. wealth creation) whereas reward in ‘administratively’ managed 
organisations is often heavily oriented towards promotion to increase responsibility levels.  
Our context and data challenges this behavioural distinction. The data showed that the local 
government agents who operated in an entrepreneurial way according to the 5 previous 
dimensions (having promoter rather than trustee behaviour) did not have direct financial 
rewards. Instead, they were motivated by political, social and career objectives. Therefore, we 
argue that the public sector context can contribute to and broaden Stevenson’s entrepreneurial 
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theory (which is based on private firms) by modifying the expected ‘promoter vs. trustee’ 
behaviour spectrum for the ‘reward structure’ dimension. Performance-related rewards exist 
in entrepreneurial public sector organisations, but they are not necessarily financial.  
 
Overall, this section illustrated that entrepreneurial behaviour was observed in the 
European funding process (along 5 out of 6 dimensions of Stevenson’s framework). The next 
section identifies types of public entrepreneurs, specifically focusing on their reward-structure. 
 
5.3 Different types of entrepreneurs in the public sector 
  
Departing from the argument of Woo (1991) that the criteria to classify entrepreneurs 
cluster around three main areas, background, goals and management methods, we classified 
our public entrepreneurs based on the following criteria: a) The factual ‘background-related’ 
criterion of the career-path (Politicians versus Public Managers), b) Three ‘goal-related’ 
classification criteria (rewards, exit strategy, and time horizon of association with the venture) 
and c) A ‘management method-related’ criterion which we called ‘personal strengths’. 
The analysis identified 5 ‘types’ of public entrepreneurs, the broad characteristics of which 
(according to the classification criteria) are summarised on table 3.  
 
Insert table 3 about here 
 
To explain the typology, we turn back to our case descriptions and give an example of the 
profile of each type of public-sector entrepreneur. 
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1) Politicians. The Italian councils have shown three different ‘types’ of politicians-public 
entrepreneurs.   
 
The professional politician 
The mayor of council F, a professional politician, identified the European funding opportunity 
and demonstrated his commitment to it by lobbying for the acquisition of the Objective 2 and 
5b status for the area. He led the council through the first round of structural funds (1994-97). 
His main strength was his ability to secure political support and to use his numerous political 
contacts (especially at the regional level) in order to acquire the needed resources (partners, 
match-funding, consultants and funding professionals). Interestingly, the mayor’s popularity 
and political career has subsequently flourished, and in 1997 he won the successive Provincial 
elections becoming the president of the province. The interviews illustrated that pursuing a 
political career was a major motivation for the mayor.  
 
The spin-off creator 
A second example of public entrepreneurship is found in the same council (F), although the 
agent was occupying a different political role. After the mayor moved on, a new project idea 
was launched to regenerate the territory. The PST project (Science and Technology Park) 
started as an idea of a councillor (a politician, elected member of the local government) and a 
small group of local professionals that he gathered together to develop the project. The 
councillor’s approach looked more business-like than political. He stressed the importance of 
being efficient, proactive, and target driven. The councillor’s strength was his ability to utilise 
both political and professional contacts. He clearly expressed his rewards – public recognition, 
personal satisfaction and independence (which he thought could not be achieved within the 
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limitations of a bureaucratic system) – and he exited the local government’s fund-raising 
‘venture’ to take the leading role in the new spin-off organisation that he created. 
 
A business entrepreneur in politics  
Another interesting case was Council J in Italy, where the mayor was also a local business 
entrepreneur. This is not a common situation in Italy where politics represents a career path 
and mayors are professional politicians. Council J was facing serious problems in the early 
1990s, caused by the closing down of its paper factories. The new mayor took up the 
challenge to increase the finances of the council and its efficiency. With the help of the new 
finance manager brought in from the private sector, the mayor lead the ‘venture’ to acquire 
European structural funds. A year after, they obtained the Objective 2 status for the area. A 
stream of European funds started flowing into the council. The mayor’s strength was his 
ability to utilise his extended business contacts and experience in starting new ventures in 
order to recruit professionals, find partner organisations and raise matching-funds.   
As a public sector entrepreneur he was motivated by status and social recognition. Because of 
his ‘local’ nature (he is a local businessman and a local public figure), he was not interested to 
upgrade his political career at the regional or national level. Instead he had a long-term 
leadership plan, involving a re-election in the same post. 
 
It is interesting to compare and contrast the time-horizon of the three different types of 
entrepreneurs, which is related to their rewards and subsequent exit strategy. In the case of the 
spin-off creator, once the idea is funded by the EU and the new organisation is born, the 
entrepreneur leaves politics and becomes the director of his own project. Because of the 
particular reward structure, the time horizon of his association with the council’s funding 
venture is rather short and the exit strategy is to spin-off as soon as the opportunity arises. 
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Instead, the professional politician is driven by political success, being in the middle of a 
booming political career. Therefore, his association with the venture covers a longer time 
period (about four years) which is the election-cycle. Finally, the business entrepreneur in 
politics perceives that his rewards of social recognition, local status and fringe benefits for his 
own business, would only be achieved if the council’s European funding venture keeps being 
successful for a long-time. Therefore, his time-horizon of association with the venture is 
longer and he is willing to exit only if he is convinced that there is a suitable successor.    
 
Public officers. The English cases have shown 2 different ‘types’ of public officers – 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The career-driven public officer 
Case E represents an interesting example. The council appeared conspicuously successful 
throughout the 1990s in winning external funding to regenerate its economy and community. 
The entrepreneurial agent was a senior officer (at the time of the interview). She has been 
working for the council for more then five years, starting as a junior funding officer. With her 
continuous drive, the European funds became an important part of the Council activities, and 
the team slowly expanded from one person to six. The funding officer was then promoted to 
senior officer, responsible for the European funding unit. Her strengths included the 
knowledge of the internal structures and processes within the organisation (which helped to 
gain the approval and support of the councillors) and her professional contacts of public 
officers in a variety of local organisations (which allowed her to recruit professionals and to 
find partners and matching funds). Her rewards included professional visibility and career 
advancement.  
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Entrepreneurial (and successful) public officers in European funding could exit the ‘venture’ 
either by moving up in the internal hierarchy of the local government in a different position, or 
opt to move to funding role in a bigger and more prestigious council. Therefore, they have a 
medium time-horizon of association with the venture (3-5 years), a period in which their 
contribution can become visible. 
 
The politically ambitious public officer 
At council A, the newly-appointed officer had worked for eight years in Brussels where she 
gained experience in EU regional policy and developed contacts with the European 
Commission. Her main task became to bring more aid into the area in order to create new 
jobs, attract businesses and lift the area from depression. She engaged in building up political 
support at the regional, national and European level to attract Objective 1 fundsiii. A network 
for sub-regional cooperation was created (known as the South Yorkshire Forum) in order to 
increase the lobbying power at the national and European level. In 1999, South Yorkshire was 
declared an Objective 1 area. Soon after, the principal officer left her post in the council and 
became a Member of the European Parliament. This is an interesting example of an 
entrepreneurial public officer, whose reward from a successful venture is social recognition 
and visibility and a subsequent new career in politics. The time horizon of association with the 
venture in this case was medium-term (about 4 years) and the ‘exit’ was linked with the 
election cycle and with an available opportunity for entry into politics. 
 
It has to be noted that the above typology was based on in-depth analysis of a small number of 
cases rather than on cluster analysis using a broad sample of observations and is therefore 
exploratory. Despite the fact that the entrepreneurs in all our cases fit comfortably within one 
of the five categories with no ‘in-betweens’, we cannot claim that we have included every 
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possible ‘type’ of public sector entrepreneur (that is actually a common problem in most 




The purpose of this study was to explore the applicability of entrepreneurship in the 
public sector by analysing empirically the European funding process in local governments. 
The main limitation of our research design is the possibility of rival explanations of the 
European funding phenomenon, based on organisational theories such as leadership (e.g. 
Harrison & Leitch, 1994) or management of change (e.g. Ferlie et al. 1996). Such theoretical 
comparisons of public-sector phenomena would be interesting for future research, but fell out 
of the scope of the current study. A subsequent practical concern was that space limitations 
did not allow for detailed case-by-case presentation of empirical evidence, and we often had to 
present aggregate findings (readers who are interested in more case-by-case detail of the 
analysis are referred to Zerbinati, 2002).   
Despite these limitations the study was successful in modelling inductively the European 
funding process in local governments (a new public sector initiative) and illustrating that the 
model fits Stevenson’s dimensions of entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial framework 
adopted here has proven to be potent in making sense of public sector initiatives. 
To tackle the question of inclusion or exclusion of ‘public sector entrepreneurs’ from the 
scientific discipline of ‘entrepreneurship’, scholars need to agree on a common, clear 
definition for research to progress (Cooper, 2001; Gartner 1985; Vesper, 1983). We propose 
the following ‘inclusive’ opportunity-based definition of entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurship 
is the ‘discovery and exploitation of rewarding opportunities (and not only profit making 
opportunities), without current control of the required resources’. The main difference of the 
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above definition with the ones by Stevenson and Shane & Venkataraman is the ‘acceptance’ 
of other potential rewards apart from profit (such as career advancement, political re-election, 
social recognition etc.).  
In general, we believe that the mainstream entrepreneurship literature should embrace 
and study the phenomenon in public settings, where politicians and public managers (and not 
traditional businessmen) act entrepreneurially, driven by non-profit rewards. Our view mirrors 
recent work on entrepreneurship in the society, presented in a special issue of 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development (May 2004). Steyaert & Katz (2004) proposed 
that entrepreneurship takes place in multiple sites and spaces (many more than the ones 
currently considered), that entrepreneurship should not be seen solely from an economic-profit 
perspective and that entrepreneurship is a matter of everyday activities rather than actions of 
elitist groups of entrepreneurs.  
Our empirical study has just touched the surface in the area of entrepreneurship in the 
public sector. There is plenty more room for research and in the following paragraphs we offer 
some suggestions.       
First, the issue of the ‘productivity’ of public sector entrepreneurship is an interesting 
issue for future research. Baumol (1990) distinguished between ‘productive’ entrepreneurship 
or the pursue of opportunities that advance production and social well-being and 
‘unproductive’ entrepreneurship that is the pursue of ‘rent-seeking’ opportunities that reward 
the entrepreneurs but are an actual impediment to production and the society in general (such 
as tax-evasion and organised crime). Looking at the productivity issue from of regional 
development perspective, Laukkanen & Niittykangas (2003) challenged the view that resource 
provision and passive waiting for entrepreneurs to emerge can change the economic fate of 
underdeveloped communities and Hjalmarsson & Johansson (2003) argued that not all 
publicly funded advisory services for local entrepreneurs are actually effective. Similarly, in 
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the case of European funding, there are political sceptics who argue that public organisations 
often become good in attracting funds, as opposed to actually producing value for their 
citizens using these funds (because the rewards for the driving individuals are associated with 
fund-acquisition rather than fund utilisation). Future research should investigate more into the 
real productivity issue of public entrepreneurship. 
Second, the case studies showed five different ‘types’ of public-sector entrepreneurs 
involved in the European funding process: professional politicians, spin-off creators, business 
entrepreneurs in politics, career-driven public officers and politically ambitious public 
officers. This typology is exploratory and non-exhaustive, as it was derived by a small number 
of case studies. Further research could extend our knowledge in this area, expanding and 
strengthening the above typology. 
In general, we believe that research in public sector entrepreneurship should be informed 
by the findings and the overall direction of the entrepreneurship field, but should also try to 
explore the particularities that the non-financial reward-structure implies. For example Shane 
& Venkataraman (2000) argued that entrepreneurship research should explain why, how and 
by whom entrepreneurial opportunities are discovered and exploited. That, we think, is an 
interesting line of exploration also for public sector entrepreneurship, but there could be an 
interesting twist. Does the nature of public-sector opportunities (difference set of rewards - no 
financial reward) change the way that people discover and exploit them? Are there 
particularities in the cognitive process, in the individual characteristics and in the resource 
base of people that are willing to exploit public sector opportunities? Such questions remain 
to be answered.  
Concluding, the authors believe that the main contribution of this study is two-fold: it is 
one of the first studies to illustrate empirically and in detail the applicability of the 
entrepreneurship process framework to public sector initiatives such as the EU funding 
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process in local governments. Secondly, it is one of the first attempts to explore different 
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Table 1: Entrepreneurs in the public sector and their characteristics in comparison to 
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Table 2: The 10 city councils analysed 
City Councils in 
Yorkshire and Humber, 
UK  
Local area* Type of local authority 1994-99 Funds 
(GBP**) 
Population 
Case 4 Humber Unitary Authority 18,566,496.00 156,243 
Case 3 South Yorkshire Metropolitan Borough 12,341,728.00 290,468 
Case 5 West Yorkshire Metropolitan Borough 10,371,162.00 395,131 
Case 1 South Yorkshire Metropolitan Borough 8,748,935.00  228,103 
Case 2 West Yorkshire Metropolitan Borough 0.00 192,824  
City Councils in 
Piedmont, Italy 
    
Case 6 Alessandria Province Commune  6,262,088.00 26,724 
Case 10 VCO Province Commune (provincial capital) 2,965,570.29  30,307 
Case 8  Alessandria Province Commune 1,684,886.31 28,886 
Case 9 Torino Province Commune (regional capital) 6,403,416.03  909,741 
Case 7 Alessandria Province Commune (provincial capital) 0.00 90,852 
*Yorkshire and Humber region included 4 sub-areas and 3 were eligible for Objective 2 of the Structural 
Funds: South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, and the Humber. Piedmont region included 6 provinces and 3 were 
eligible for Objective 2 of the Structural Funds: Alessandria, Verbanio-Cusio-Ossola, and Torino. 
**The currency adopted is Great Britain Pound. 
 
Table 3. A proposed typology of public entrepreneurs 
Type Background  Goals  Management 
method 
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i
 We stress that our concept of ‘success’ is constrained only to the absorption of European funds. Councils that 
were ‘unsuccessful’ in absorbing European funds, were not necessarily overall unsuccessful in their role to serve 
their citizens.  
ii
 Section C will deal in more detail with the different types of entrepreneurial agents in local government.  
iii
 The area was already eligible for Objective 2 of the Structural funds. The Objective 1 status (which opened a 
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